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"We cannot strengthen international law by ignoring the realities
that determine the operation of power."1
On April 30, 1982, the final day of the United Nations Conference
of the Law of the Sea, twenty-one nations either abstained from vot-
ing, or voted against the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS III).1 These twenty-one nations included most of the highly
industrialized countries, most of the maritime powers and all those
countries engaged in the development of the technology of deep seabed
mining and the exploration of the mineral deposits beyond the limits
of the continental shelf. Those lacking enthusiasm for the new code for
the oceans included countries from both East and West.
At the time when the vote was taken, only the United States dele-
gation gave a reasoned explanation for its position. Speaking for the
United States, Mr. Malone cited a number of reasons.8 In the first
place, the regime for deep seabed mining would determine the develop-
ment of deep seabed resources. The United States opposed the provi-
sions of the Convention which provided for a so-called Review Confer-
ence in which a three-fourths majority of the signatories could approve
amendments modifying the mining regime.4 The United States also op-
posed the revision which gave the International Deep Seabed Author-
ity the power to set prices5 and to order the transfer of technology
developed by United States companies to foreign and international
interests.'
United States objections rested upon both practical and constitu-
*Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. M.L.L., University of Lvov, 1931;
S.J.D., Harvard University, 1933; Dr. Jur., University of Lvov, 1934.
1. C. DE VisscHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW viii (1968).
2. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 62/122.
3. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, col. 1.
4. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, art. 155(4).
5. Id. arts. 150(f), 150(h) & 151.
6. Id. art. 144.
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tional grounds. Provisions of the Convention offended some of the ba-
sic ideas about the free play of economic forces, the role of the market
place and the respect for property rights guaranteed by the American
Constitution. In addition, delegation to an international agency of the
right to expropriate patents, "know-how" and American technology
was legally impossible.
Several months later, the government of the United Kingdom as-
sociated itself with the United States position voicing similar objec-
tions. In a communique, the United Kingdom declared itself unable to
join the Convention for two reasons: the organization and the preroga-
tives of the Deep Seabed Authority, and its right to order the transfer
of technology to benefit foreign and international interests. Obviously,
as in the American case, property rights of British subjects cannot be
subject to controls vested in an international agency.
At the Montego Bay, Jamaica session of UNCLOS III, the situa-
tion changed. One hundred seventeen nations signed the Convention
while twenty-three declined to sign. In addition, twenty-four nations
did not attend the Conference. While during the spring session the So-
viet Bloc had abstained from voting, this time it joined the majority.
Among those who refused to sign were Japan and all the major indus-
trial powers of the West with the exception of France.7
The industrial and maritime powers' dissatisfaction with the deep
seabed mining provisions of Part XI beclouds the prospect of the gen-
eral adoption of the Convention. However, nearly twelve years of nego-
tiations and the aborted Second United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea have not been an altogether wasted effort. With the
exception of Part XI, the Convention is a sound body of law and a
welcome systematization of the law of the sea and of institutions gen-
erally recognized either in earlier agreements or in judicial precedent
and state practice. High sea navigation, s the protection of marine life
and of the environment,9 the law of the flag,10 the status of government
ships,11 the status of ships engaged in maritime commerce 2 and the
prevention of piracy' s are among the areas that have been felicitously
codified, and will be-whether the Convention is formally adopted or
not-a ready source of reference for legal and diplomatic practice.
Even where new situations and innovations were necessary, the
7. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1982, at Al, col. 2.
8. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, arts. 87-90.
9. Id. pt. XII.
10. Id. arts. 90-99.
11. Id. pt. II §§ 3B, 3C.
12. Id. pt. II § 3B.
13. Id. arts. 100-107.
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Conference was able to devise solutions which cannot be challenged.
These new situations and innovations include the exclusive economic
zone," the regime of waters of the archipelagoes,18 international
straits" and scientific research in waters subject to coastal states' con-
trol.1 7 They were approved by a large number of state-members of the
international community and were a logical consequence of the appli-
cation of the generally recognized principle of innocent passage to
novel situations. Under the doctrine of opinio juris sive necessitatis,
regimes of international straits and of the archipelagoes, as provided
for in the Convention, seem to be a part of the traditional law of the
sea.
While the task of codification of the general regime of the law of
the oceans was within the mandate received from the United Nations, "
the Conference overstepped the limits of discretion with regard to the
design for the International Deep Seabed Authority. In its final draft,
the Convention provided for an international organization" which was
given direct powers over matters which traditionally, and under the
United Nations charter, were clearly within the compass of domestic
jurisdiction.
One of the main causes of this unhappy outcome seems to be the
absence of proper preparatory work for the diplomatic negotiations at
UNCLOS III. The Conference labored without the benefit of a draft
prepared by experts. All major pieces of legislation, beginning with the
Code of Justinian and ending with modern codes and international
treaties, are usually the product of an expert or a small group of ex-
perts. Invariably, codification, whether national or international, gives
shape to earlier social and political transformations which were already
a reality. For example, the Code of Napoleon, the Code of Justinian,
Soviet codes and those of Fascist Italy reflected the actual state of af-
fairs and were neither socially nor politically innovative.
Seen in the light of the traditional functions of international orga-
nizations, the powers of the International Deep Seabed Authority are
clearly revolutionary. Part XI of the Convention proposes to give to
the Authority direct administrative control over certain uses of the
open seas 0 similar to those exercised by the governments in state terri-
14. Id. pt. V.
15. Id. pt. IV.
16. Id. pt. 111.
17. Id. pt. XIII.
18. 18 G.A. Res. 2750 C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 26, U.N. Doe. A/8208
(1971).
19. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, pt. XI, § 4.
20. ld. art. 160.
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tory. Indeed, in many respects this control is broader than the federal
government's control of mining in the United States. The Authority is
given power to license deep seabed exploration and extraction of min-
erals beyond the limits of the continental shelf,21 to obtain property
rights in the share of the mineral deposits discovered by the nationals
of parties to the Convention,2 2 to mine these deposits on its own ac-
count2 3 and to tax the proceeds of the industrial activity of the na-
tional deep seabed mining companies.2 " By fixing prices of the ex-
tracted minerals, the Authority would control the mineral market on a
worldwide scale. In addition, the Authority has the right to order the
transfer of technology owned by deep seabed mining interests either to
develop its own mining activities or to develop those of the third-world
countries. The design for the international organization to control deep
seabed mining exceeds all past attempts in its scope. It is clear that the
provisions of the Convention are unacceptable to all those countries
whose national constitutions vest the power of taxation in the repre-
sentative bodies and guarantee property rights.
To handle the enormous and complex tasks of the Authority, the
Convention proposes to establish a vast bureaucratic organization
staffed, at the instar of the United Nations Secretariat, by a throng of
international civil servants drafted from the member countries. 25 Fur-
thermore, since at the present level of technology it will be decades
before extraction of minerals from the oceans becomes economically
feasible,2" the Authority and its bureaucracy are to be financed by the
industrialized countries which would have to bear the main financial
burden of the proposed organization." From the American perspective,
the Convention demonstrates a lack of understanding of what is really
achievable. United States Senators can hardly be.expected to advise
and consent to the ratification of a document which would restrict so
severely the powers of the United States government and the preroga-
tives of Congress.
21. Id. arts. 152(2)(a), 153 & Annex III, art. 3.
22. Id. arts. 137(2), 160(2)(f)(i) & 160(2)(g).
23. Id. arts. 151(5) & 153(2)(a).
24. Id. art. 171.
25. Id. art. 167.
26. See generally R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES 215-38 (1979). In
a discussion of current experimental and future technologies for deep seabed mineral
extraction, Eckert argues that projections indicate an eight-fold increase in the yields of
certain minerals by the year 2000. Given the high initial capital investments required,
however, it will not be until after this date that deep seabed mining will become econom-
ically feasible. Id.
27. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, art. 160(3). The United
States was to contribute 25% of the budget. Id.
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Many treaties far less offensive to the prerogatives of the United
States Congress have died in committee in spite of strong support from
the administration. The International Trade Organization, an initiative
of President Truman, and the Trade Cooperation Treaty, a replace-
ment for the unsuccessful International Trade Organization, shared the
same fate as they both sought to limit congressional power to control
foreign trade. Similarly, SALT II and the 1972 Soviet-American Trade
Agreement were rejected in spite of strong administration urgings. It
was certainly presumptuous to hope that American Senators would
consent to the creation of another international organization at the ex-
pense of the American taxpayer. There is no climate for such a propo-
sal. It is dubious whether the United States Congress, or any other
parliament in an industrialized country, would seriously consider ad-
ding another level of industrial regulation which would be exercised by
an international organization.
Some of the inability to comprehend legal limitations upon the
diplomatic process must be credited to the fact that the majority of
diplomats representing the vast host of countries participating in UN-
CLOS III have had little, if any, parliamentary or diplomatic experi-
ence. The Conference was aware of the difficulties it faced in its gigan-
tic task. It had to devise a legal response to a change in international
relations occasioned by new technology affecting maritime industries
and uses of the seas. It set out to prepare a Convention which would be
supported by all. Despite the resolution on consensus, the Conference
failed in its resolve. This is another aspect of UNCLOS III which must
be examined.
The Conference was an enormous assemblage of diplomats, repre-
senting in its final stages 157 countries. Acting under the United Na-
tions mandate,2 8 it was a special edition of the United Nations General
Assembly with powers far exceeding those accorded under the United
Nations Charter which concentrates substantive competencies in the
Security Council dominated by the principal great powers. Due to its
size, the Conference was forced to develop a unique style of diplomacy,
frequently pitting the interests of the users of the oceans (maritime
countries with large fishing fleets and real interests in freedom of navi-
gation, protection of marine environment and fishery conservation)
against countries which had no real maritime interests. The latter
group, the "Group of 77,'"29 bargained in order to obtain advantages
28. 18 G.A. Res. 2750 C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/8208
(1971).
29. See Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-
Bed Authority, 7 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 31, 61 n.7 (1979). The name "Group of 77"
refers to the original 77 developing countries which joined together and pursued their
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which had little or no connection with the real objective of the Confer-
ence. This peculiar style of diplomacy, featuring trade-offs and package
deals, wasted time and opportunity.
On several occasions the United States Secretary of State urged
the Conference to proceed expeditiously. Secretary Kissinger, long
before the Conference completed its task, sounded a note of alarm and
deep disappointment with the pace of the Conference's progress. In his
speech on April 8, 1976 before the members of the Foreign Policy Asso-
ciation, the United States Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce and the United Nations Association of the United States,
Secretary Kissinger urged the Conference to proceed expeditiously,
and he stated that should another session of UNCLOS III be needed, it
should be the last.80 While the Conference disregarded these warnings,
the United States Congress proceeded with legislation, without the
support of the Administration, to protect American fisheries.31 Some
interests within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Id.
30. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1976, at Al, col. 4.
31. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat.
331 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1812 (1976)). During the hearings on the bill the House
consulted the Departments of Commerce, State, Interior, Justice, Treasury, Defense and
Transportation. House requests were referred to the National Security Interagency
Taskforce on the Law of the Sea, which raised important objections to the bill. These
objections were set forth in the report as follows:
1. Unilateral action now could seriously undermine U.S. efforts in the Law of
the Sea Conference and hamper chances for a satisfactory multilateral settle-
ment of the fisheries question.
2. Such unilateral action runs counter to established fundamental principles of
international law and would encourage similar jurisdictional claims by other
countries, thereby prejudicing U.S. distant water fishing interests such as tuna
and shrimp.
3. Serious foreign policy and enforcement problems would result if other dis-
tant-water fishing nations refused to recognize our unilateral claims.
4. The bill lacks certain provisions contained in the U.S. proposal for a 200-mile
economic zone at the Law of the Sea Conference, which are necessary to protect
the interests of all States and the international community in general. These
include consideration of the diverse interests of the international community,
compulsory dispute settlement, and the payment of reasonable fees to defray
regulatory costs.
H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 593, 595.
As the House Report indicates, Congressional policy was directly opposed to the line
followed by the Executive:
As a matter of policy, for the last several years the United States has been ada-
mantly opposed to any extension of fishery jurisdiction beyond 12 miles. In fact,
the Executive Branch of the Government has generally supported the principle
of unlimited freedom of the seas as being in the best interest of the Nation. This
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time later, in view of the fact that American citizens began seriously
exploring opportunities for mineral extractions from the deep seabed,
Congress enacted a law to protect American interests. 2
Clearly, another format for the law of the sea was preferable to
that adopted by UNCLOS III. For example, the Non-Proliferation
is attributable to strong naval interest, the need to import large amounts of en-
ergy and raw materials by water, and distant water fishing interests, notably
tuna and shrimp.
Id. at 599. American foreign policy regarding the protection and regulation of interna-
tional fisheries was "the so-called 'species' approach, designed to assert no geographical
fisheries jurisdiction." Id. The Report continued:
Under this proposal, coastal nations would be given regulatory jurisdiction over
coastal and anadromous species of fish, together with preferential rights to such
fish up to the level of their capacity. The actual limit of coastal jurisdiction over
these species would be determined by their location, not by any arbitrary geo-
graphical line.
Id.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 411, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1600, 1600-01.
The purposes of H.R. 2759, as amended, are to establish an interim program to
encourage and regulate the development of hard mineral resources of the deep
seabed by United States citizens; to insure that the development of hard mineral
resources of the deep seabed are conducted in a manner which will encourage
the orderly and efficient development of such resources, will protect the environ-
ment, and will promote the safety of life and property at sea; to encourage the
successful negotiation of a comprehensive international Law of the Sea Treaty
which will give legal definition to the principle that the mineral resources of the
deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind, and pending the entering into
force of such a Treaty, to provide for the establishment of a special fund the
proceeds of which shall be used for sharing with the international community
pursuant to such Treaty; and to allow the continued development of technology
necessary to develop the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed as soon as
possible.
The United States supported the United Nations Geneva Assembly Resolu-
tion 2749 (XXV) of December 17, 1970, which declared the principle that the
mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind, but
recognized that this principle would be legally defined under the terms of a com-
prehensive Law of the Sea Treaty to be agreed upon in the future.
Since 1967, efforts have been underway in the United Nations to establish
an international regime governing exploitation of the deep seabed. To date those
efforts have been unsuccessful. Most recently the 8th Session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, Switzerland, which
completed business on April 28, adjourned without a final agreement. A summer
session in New York reconvened on July 16, 1979.
The Administration, realizing the ongoing difficulty of the Law of the Sea
Treaty negotiations, has indicated its support for legislation establishing a do-
mestic regime for deep seabed mining whether or not there is an international
treaty.
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Treaty,38 which finally was adopted by over a hundred countries, was
the work of the nuclear club. The Space Treaty, 4 also widely adopted,
was based upon the agreement between the Soviet Union and the
United States.
In his April 8, 1976 speech, Secretary Kissinger proposed that the
suggested International Deep Seabed Authority should be comprised of
an assembly of all member-states to give general policy guidance; an
executive, decision-making council; a tribunal to resolve disputes
through legal processes; and an administrative secretariat. In order
that all nations, developed and developing, should have adequate ac-
cess to seabed mining, Dr. Kissinger proposed that non-discriminatory
access be guaranteed for states and their nationals to deep seabed re-
sources under specified and reasonable conditions. Further, he pro-
posed that the Authority supervise a system of revenue-sharing from
mining activities for the use of the international community, primarily
for the needs of the poorest countries. Under this system some of the
international revenue from deep seabed mining would be used for "ad-
justment assistance." Those producer countries injured by the compe-
tition from seabed production would be aided by compensating them
for loss of sales, by stabilizing their earnings and, in some cases, by
helping them to diversify their economies. Mr. Kissinger's plan clearly
envisaged the organization of the Authority according to the United
Nations pattern, i.e., placing actual policy implementation in the hands
of the technologically advanced countries. This pattern was clearly
unacceptable.
The Convention on International Civil Aviation 5 and the Interna-
tional Maritime Satellite Organization" offer more practical and ac-
ceptable models for the international management of deep seabed min-
ing. Both of these agreements provide for two levels of international
cooperation. In the Convention, matters of policy and international
regulation are the responsibility of the Civil Aviation Organization,
while the business aspects of civil aviation belong to the association of
33. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. This treaty was mainly the product of negotiations
between the two major nuclear powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R. See generally
Willrich, The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology
Confronts World Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447 (1968).
34. Treaty on Principles Governing the Acts of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
35. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 STAT. 1180, T.I.A.S.
No. 1591.
36. International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARST), Feb. 15, 1979, 31
U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 9605.
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carriers. Similarly, in the International Maritime Satellite Organiza-
tion, the management of the affairs of the Organization is the responsi-
bility of the individual governments as partners, while the technical
and business aspects of satellite operations are the responsibility of
private business groups. Perhaps this latter model could be effectively
adapted to the needs of the organization and management of deep sea-
bed mining.
One final observation must be made. It would be far more expedi-
tious to deal with discrete issues in the law of the sea severally, dealing
with more urgent matters first and with those that could wait at a later
date. Certainly, deep seabed mining could have been more effectively
handled in a separate conference and agreement.
As matters stand at present, one can see that an independent deep
seabed mining regime is emerging. Following the American example, a
number of industrialized countries have enacted legislation on licens-
ing and regulation of deep seabed mining. The United States, the
United Kingdom, West Germany, the Soviet Union, France and Italy
are already in the deep seabed mining club, at least in terms of their
national legislation, and there seems to be a strong likelihood that Ja-
pan will also join. Lesser industrial countries would be able to partici-
pate in these mining activities under the flag of a major industrialized
state, and they could participate either in joint ventures or in interna-
tional consortia to finance such activities. While earlier American legis-
lation was of an interim character, bills have been introduced in both
the House and the Senate which no longer envisage the operation of
American mining interests within the framework provided by the Con-
vention and they may set the trend towards the development of a new
arrangement.
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